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Non-technical summary 
Theories of fairness preferences have gained remarkable attention throughout much of recent 
economic literature. Formal models have been proposed which are able to explain behaviour 
that is yet unexplained by the classical model of the strictly egocentric economic man (“homo 
oeconomicus”). These models have been tested in laboratory experiments. In another, 
seemingly unrelated, strand of experimental literature the focus lies on the influence of the 
origin of money, disposed of by subjects in economic experiments on the subjects' behaviour. 
It has been frequently found that it makes a difference whether the money comes in form of 
windfall gains, granted by the experimenter (“house money”), or if it is a form of 
compensation for “real efforts”, exerted by the subjects during the experiment itself. An 
important open question is how these two strands of research fit together. How does the house 
money effect influence fairness preferences revealed in the lab, and their explanatory power 
for individual behaviour in other games? If there is a significant influence to be found, the 
origin of the money clearly deserves to be a part of modern theories of individual preferences. 
This paper is dedicated to answering the above question.  
For this purpose, we experimentally elicit subjects’ fairness preferences controlling for the 
origin of the money and test the theoretical predictions for individual behaviour in a social 
dilemma situation. As a representative for theories of fairness preferences, we chose the 
model of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Our results indicate that individual 
inequality aversion is not generally robust to the way endowments emerge. Overall, we 
observe a low predictive power of the theoretical model which is significantly affected by the 
way the endowment in the preference elicitation games emerges. In particular, the theoretical 
model has only predictive power for individual behaviour in selected cases when the 
endowment is house money. As soon as the endowment for preference elicitation has to be 
earned, the predictive power disappears. Therefore, future experimental research into fairness 
preferences and their relevance for individual behaviour in many economic areas has to 
consider the origin of the monetary endowment. 
Das Wichtigste in Kürze 
In den letzten Jahren haben ökonomische Theorien zu Fairnesspräferenzen zunehmend an 
Aufmerksamkeit gewonnen. Zahlreiche formale Modelle wurden entwickelt, um individuelles 
Verhalten zu erklären, welches nicht mit der ökonomischen Standardtheorie vom Homo 
oeconomicus in Einklang steht. Für den Test dieser Modelle werden insbesondere 
ökonomische Laborexperimente genutzt. Ein anderer, davon zunächst unabhängiger Bereich 
der experimentellen Verhaltensökonomik beschäftigt sich mit der Frage, inwieweit die 
Entstehung der monetären Anfangsausstattung in Laborexperimenten das Verhalten der 
Versuchspersonen beeinflusst. Es macht oftmals einen großen Unterschied, ob das Geld den 
Versuchspersonen geschenkt wird oder ob diese sich das Geld zunächst durch reale 
Anstrengungen verdienen müssen. Die vorliegende Arbeit bringt diese zwei Bereiche 
zusammen und untersucht die Frage, inwieweit die Entstehung der Anfangsausstattung die im 
Labor gezeigten Fairnesspräferenzen und deren Exklärungskraft für individuelles Verhalten in 
anderen Spielen beeinflusst. 
Dafür messen wir mit Hilfe einfacher experimenteller Spiele die Fairnesspräferenzen der 
Versuchspersonen bei gleichzeitiger Kontrolle der Entstehung der Anfangsausstattung und 
überprüfen dann die Bedeutung der Präferenzen für das individuelle Verhalten in einem 
sozialen Dilemma. Dabei verwenden wir das Modell der Ungleichheitsaversion von Fehr und 
Schmidt (1999). Unsere Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die individuelle Ungleichheitsaversion von 
der Art und Weise der Entstehung der Anfangsausstattung beeinflusst wird. Darüber hinaus ist 
die Erklärungskraft des Modells für das individuelle Verhalten im sozialen Dilemma gering 
und ebenfalls von der Entstehung der Anfangsausstattung abhängig. Nur in Einzelfällen 
stimmen beobachtetes und erwartetes Verhalten überein, wenn die Anfangsausstattung 
verschenkt wird. Sobald das Geld durch reale Anstrengungen verdient wird, verliert das 
Modell der Ungleichheitsaversion seine Erklärungskraft. Zukünftige experimentelle 
Untersuchungen von Fairnesspräferenzen und ihrer Relevanz für individuelles Verhalten in 
unterschiedlichen ökonomischen Situationen sollten daher die Entstehung der monetären 
Anfangsausstattung berücksichtigen. 
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1 Introduction 
Theories of other-regarding preferences have gained remarkable attention throughout much of 
recent economic literature. Formal models have been proposed which are able to explain 
behaviour that is yet unexplained by the classical model of the strictly egocentric economic 
man (“homo oeconomicus”).1 In another, seemingly unrelated, strand of experimental 
literature, the focus lies on the influence of the origin of the money, disposed of by subjects in 
economic experiments on the subjects' behaviour. It has been frequently found that it makes a 
difference whether the money comes in form of windfall gains granted by the experimenter 
(“house money”), or if it is a form of compensation for “real efforts”, exerted by the subjects 
during the experiment itself.2  
An important open question is how these two strands of research fit together. How does the 
house money effect influence other-regarding preferences revealed in the lab? If there is a 
significant influence to be found, the origin of money clearly deserves to be part of modern 
theories of individual preferences. This paper is dedicated to answering the above question. 
As a representative for theories of other-regarding preferences, we chose the model by Fehr 
and Schmidt (1999). Our reason for this choice is that this model presents a simple and well-
established theoretical framework that allows for the explanation and prediction of human 
behaviour in various strategic decision situations, as demonstrated in Fehr and Schmidt (1999, 
2006). Still, one question remains: Do the results of the model hold in the presence of money 
originating from real efforts as they do in the case of house money? 
The model by Fehr and Schmidt (1999; in the following F&S) captures other-regarding 
preferences in form of inequality aversion by introducing two parameters into the utility 
function measuring the disutility from advantageous and disadvantageous inequality. Among 
others, the model offers an easy explanation for the persistent phenomenon of voluntary 
cooperation in prisoner’s dilemma and public good games: Individuals who are averse to 
unequal payoff distributions obviously also dislike being exploited by free riders and similarly 
dislike exploiting others by free riding in cooperation games. Hence, the theory creates a close 
                                                 
1 For prominent examples of models of other-regarding preferences, see Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000), or Charness and Rabin (2002). 
2 The house money effect has been investigated in different areas of research and with different experimental 
settings. Beside dictator and ultimatum games, there are at least two further strands in the literature: house 
money effects in Public good games, e.g. Clark (2002), Cherry et al. (2005, 2007), and Kroll et al. (2007), and 
house money effects in settings where subjects face risky choices, e.g. Keeler et al. (1985), Thaler and Johnson 
(1990), Arkes et al. (1994), Keasey and Moon (1996), and Ackert et al. (2006). 
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link between subjects’ attitudes to inequality aversion and subjects’ behaviour in other classes 
of games such as the prisoner’s dilemma.  
As the F&S model is intended to describe (individual) preferences, it must principally be open 
to within-subject tests, i.e. checking whether individuals identified as “fair” (inequality 
averse) in the sense of the theory behave consistently in other games. This is exactly the 
approach followed in this paper. The F&S model has so far been subject to only few empirical 
within-subjects tests – and the evidence is mixed. Blanco et al. (2008) find that the F&S 
model has some explanatory power on the aggregate, but not on the individual level. Blanco 
et al. (2008) use a two-step method. They first measure individual degrees of inequality 
aversion using a modified dictator and ultimatum game. In the second step, the subjects play 
(among others) a simple one shot public good game. Dannenberg et al. (2007) use a similar 
design to test F&S. They first elicit the subjects’ inequality aversion parameters and then play 
a standard public good game, which is repeated ten times. Dannenberg et al. (2007) find that 
the F&S model has some explanatory power under certain conditions: What is needed for 
individuals to behave according to F&S’s prediction is certain information about their co-
players' inequality aversion. Teyssier (2009) investigates the F&S model in sequential public 
good games. She finds that first mover behaviour is driven by beliefs and risk aversion but, 
opposed to theory, not by disadvantageous inequality aversion. In contrast, second mover 
behaviour is driven by advantageous inequality aversion. 
In this paper, we reconsider eliciting preference parameters and report on new experiments 
testing whether the F&S model has predictive power on an individual level for cases with and 
without house money. To measure the individual degrees of inequality aversion we use the 
two-step method proposed by Blanco et al. (2007), i.e. we measure inequality aversion using 
modified dictator and ultimatum games. Different from former studies, all games are 
constructed in order make decisions for our subjects as easy as possible. Consequently, we 
used dichotomous games as a means of measuring subjects’ attitudes towards inequality 
aversion. In order to check for cooperative behaviour we employ one shot prisoner’s dilemma 
games. Given the subjects’ inequality aversion elicited before we are able to compare 
individual behaviour with the predictions by the F&S model. 
What makes our experiments different from all studies undertaken before is the fact that we 
explicitly focus on the role of the origin of money spent in our experiments. Cherry (2001) 
and Cherry et al. (2002) observe that in a dictator game – similar to the one applied in order to 
elicit the F&S-parameter indicating the extent of inequality aversion – selfish behaviour 
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significantly increased when the money had to be earned in a task previous to the genuine 
experiment. The insight that dictators may be less benevolent when feeling entitled to their 
endowment can be traced back to the work of Hoffman et al. (1994) who also analyse this 
effect in the ultimatum game. They find that offers are clearly smaller if the proposer earns 
the right to his role instead of having it assigned randomly. Ruffle (1998) lets recipients 
compete in a skill-testing contest where the outcome determines the size of the monetary 
stake: Successful recipients are given a higher amount than losing recipients. The pie is then 
divided by the dictator in the dictator game and the proposer in the ultimatum game. Results 
indicate, that compared to a control treatment the dictators reward skilful recipients with 
higher offers but punish unskilful ones only moderately with slightly lower offers. 
Endowing subjects in an experiment according to their performance in a real effort task means 
endowing different people with different amounts of money, so any behavioural difference 
observed could also be caused by a stake effect. Meaning an accurate experimental design 
should also check for a stake effect. Consequently, we have two treatment variables in our 
experiment. Firstly, we vary the way the initial endowment has emerged. Thereby, we 
distinguish between the “Effort” case, where the endowment has to be earned, and the “No 
effort” or house money case, where the money is granted by the experimenter. Secondly, in 
order to avoid stake effects when analysing a potential house money effect, we vary the 
endowments disposed of by the subjects. In the “Rich” case, the subjects dispose a larger 
amount of money than in the “Poor” case.  
In our experiment, the weight of advantageous inequality aversion remains constant across all 
treatments. However, we observe a house money effect for the extent of the aversion against 
disadvantageous inequality: when subjects have to exert effort before the decision task, they 
show a stronger aversion against disadvantageous inequality. Thus, the distribution of types 
with specific F&S preferences is affected by the treatment variables. Overall, we observe a 
low predictive power of the F&S model which is significantly affected by the way the 
endowment in the preference elicitation games emerges. In particular, the F&S model has 
only predictive power for individual behaviour in selected cases when the endowment is 
house money. As soon as the endowment for preference elicitation has to be earned by having 
to employ real effort, the predictive power of the F&S model disappears. 
The remaining paper is organised as follows: section 2 introduces the games and very briefly 
outlines the theory of Fehr and Schmidt (1999). Section 3 describes our experimental setting. 
Section 4 presents the results, and section 5 discusses the results and concludes. 
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2 Theoretical background: The model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
2.1 Inequality aversion 
According to Fehr and Schmidt (1999) individuals are not exclusively motivated by the 
absolute payoff they can earn, but also value allocations due to their distributional 
consequences. Particularly, F&S assume that individuals suffer from differences between 
others’ payoffs and their own. In the two-subjects case which is particularly relevant for our 
experimental setting the F&S utility function for subject i  has the following form: 
( ) { } { }0,max0,max, jiiijiijiiU ππβππαπππ −−−−=   (1) 
where iπ  and π  denote the absolute payoffs of subjects  and j i j , respectively, 0≥iα  
measures the impact of disadvantageous inequality on i ’s utility, while  measures the 
corresponding impact of advantageous inequality.
0≥βi
3 F&S assume 1<iβ , i.e. players are not 
willing to “burn” their money to eliminate advantageous inequality. In addition, they assume 
that players put a weakly stronger weight on disadvantageous inequality, i.e. ii βα ≥ .4  
2.2 The prisoner’s dilemma game  
The assumption of inequality aversion has a strong impact on the theoretical predictions of the 
outcomes in several classes of games. In a prisoner’s dilemma game (PD) for example, 
preferences of the F&S type may lead to the cooperative outcome in contrast to the prediction 
derived by standard economic theory. To see this, look at the following symmetric PD: Both 
players  are given some initial endowment  which can either be contributed to a 
public project or not. Player i’s contribution to the project is denoted by . The production 
function for the project is simply given by the sum over the contributions of both subjects. Let 
1,2i = y
ig
                                                 
3 In the following, all conditions are stated for the case of two players. The generalisation to the n-player case is 
straightforward and can be found in Fehr and Schmidt (1999). 
4 This condition is employed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in order to facilitate the critical condition for 
cooperation in a voluntary contribution game (VCG). Proposition 4 of their proof (part C, p. 862) states that a 
player with 1i mβ > − , where  denotes the marginal per capita return of the public investment, chooses to 
cooperate in a VCG if the following condition is met: 
m
( ) ( ) ( )1 1i ik n m iβ α β− ≤ + − +  where k are players with 
1i mβ < − . If ii βα ≥  then this is the sole condition that has to be fulfilled. If one abandons ii βα ≥ , then a 
second condition might become binding, namely ( )1k n m− ≤ 2 . As we will see in section 3, for treatments 
with cooperation hypothesis this condition always holds in our experiment. 
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us assume that the per capita return of an investment in the project is given as some constant 
 with m 1 2 1.m< <  Then the monetary payoff for player  is given by i
( ) ( )1 2 1 2,i ig g y g m g g= − + +π . Thus, for player i  it is a dominant strategy to choose 0=ig  
and the unique equilibrium of this game is not to contribute to the project. However, mutual 
cooperation, i.e. , would be beneficial since the collective return is . Hence, the 
social optimum is achieved, if both players contribute their initial endowment to the project 
leading to payoff , which is more than the payoff players would receive in the 
Nash equilibrium ( ). 
ygi =
2SOi myπ =
yπ NEi =
m
2 >1m
F&S show that this result is fundamentally altered if players are endowed with inequality 
aversion according to (1). They prove the following results: 
i. If 1iβ+ <
m
, then it is a dominant strategy for player i  to choose g  .0=i
ii. Let 1 1β+ < m, but 2 1β+ ≥ . Although player 2 is relatively strongly averse to 
inequality, in the unique equilibrium both players choose not to contribute, i.e. 
2,1,0 = . = igi
miii. If, however, 1iβ+ >
gi ,0∈=
 holds for both players, an equilibrium with positive 
contributions to the project exist, i.e. both players choose contribution levels 
[ ]yg . 
The intuition behind these results is the following. First, if a player with 1im β+ <  invests in 
the project his monetary return is  while he gains a maximum non-monetary utility of m iβ . 
Now, if the sum of both returns is less than one, it is obviously the best strategy not to invest 
into the project, irrespectively of what the other player does. Second, if the other player obeys 
to 1jm β+ < , player i  will not be willing to contribute even if he shows stronger aversion to 
advantageous inequality, i.e. for him 1im β+ >  holds. In this case player i cannot reduce 
advantageous inequality, but only increase disadvantageous inequality. Only if both players 
are sufficiently strong averse to advantageous inequality they are able to sustain the 
cooperative outcome in the PD. 
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2.3 The prisoner’s dilemma game with punishment 
The idea, that punishment of defecting players may increase cooperation in the PD, is 
straightforward. In a setting with standard preferences, however, punishment is a non credible 
threat. Imagine a two-stage game: Stage one is the PD as described in the section above. Stage 
two of the game incorporates the possibility for a player to enact some punishment on the 
opponent. A player i can punish his opponent j by lowering the opponent's payoff by 
( )1ijp m y> −
0>c
. In order to reduce an opponent's payoff, the punisher must incur costs of 
. Since punishment is costly, it will not be carried out by rational players interested only 
in their absolute material payoff on the second stage. Since players anticipate the outcome on 
the second stage they will not contribute in the first stage of the game. 
This outcome is substantially altered if preferences of the F&S type are involved. Two 
possibilities have to be distinguished. First, if only one player – who is called a “conditionally 
cooperative enforcer” – obeys 1i mβ ≥ −  and if, in addition, this player is also sufficiently 
averse of disadvantageous inequality, i.e. if ( )cci −> 1α , then a subgame perfect equilibrium 
exists where both players choose to contribute [ ]yggi ,0∈= . The reason is simple: If the 
other player does not contribute, the enforcer will carry out the punishment ( )1ijp m y> −  in 
the second stage of the game. This threat is credible, because the punishment eliminates the 
disutility the enforcer derives from disadvantageous inequality. In addition, the condition 
1i mβ ≥ −  guarantees that the enforcer will prefer to cooperate on the first stage of this game 
due to his relatively high degree of aversion to advantageous inequality. Second, the same 
outcome, however, can be achieved, if both players obey ( )cci −> 1α , irrespectively of their 
degree of aversion against advantageous inequality. In this case, both players relatively 
strongly dislike disadvantageous inequality and both players simply police each other. 
3 Experimental design and hypotheses 
We used four different games (games A, B, C, and D) in our experimental design. The 
purpose of games A and B was to elicit each subject’s type, according to the F&S model. 
After the elicitation games, subjects are matched into pairs depending on their behaviour in 
games A and B and interact with each other in two PD games (games C and D). All games 
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were played one-shot between two players.5 The co-player changes between all games so that 
each pair of players meets only once. Thereby a player could meet in game D another type of 
co-player than in game C. This section presents the treatments, the design of all games and the 
corresponding hypotheses. 
3.1 Treatments 
Our design comprises two treatment variables (see table 1). The first treatment variable is 
called “Emergence of endowment” and has the specifications “Effort”, where subjects had to 
earn their endowment, and “No effort”, where subjects are given house money. In the Effort 
specification subjects earned their endowment by typing the data6 of journal articles in an 
excel file. We chose this kind of work because it is a tedious real-effort task which demands 
subjects’ effort in a real sense. The best 50 % who typed most of the journal articles gained a 
high endowment (€10.00), and the others gained a low endowment (€5.00). In the No effort 
specification one half of subjects randomly obtained the high endowment and the other half 
the low endowment. While the subjects in the Effort specification knew of the existence of 
two different endowments7 and how they were allocated the subjects in the No Effort 
specification did not. Accordingly, the second treatment variable, called “Stakes”, has the 
specifications “Rich”, where subjects disposed of a high endowment (€10.00), and “Poor”, 
where the subjects disposed of a low endowment (€5.00). Applying a 2 x 2 factorial design 
generates four treatments which are depicted in table 1. 
Table 1: Treatments 
Treatment variable  Stakes 
 Specification Rich Poor 
Effort Effort rich Effort poor Emergence of 
endowment No effort No effort rich No effort poor 
Notes: Subjects were evenly distributed across the four treatments.  
This design enables us to study the behavioural changes caused by different stakes (Rich vs. 
Poor) in an effort and no-effort situation (called “stake effect”) as well as the effects triggered 
                                                 
5 We used z-tree for programming. See Fischbacher (2007). 
6 Title and authors of the article, name, volume, and page number of the journal. 
7 They were informed about their relative performance, so subjects could infer to which group (rich or poor) they 
belong. 
 7
by differences in the emergence of endowment (Effort vs. No effort) in a high and low-stakes 
situation (called “house money effect”).  
3.2 Elicitation games – typecasting individuals 
Game A is a modified dictator game designed to measure the subjects’ aversion against 
advantageous inequality. There are two players, the dictator and the recipient. The dictator 
decides how to divide his endowment between himself and the recipient. In case of the high 
endowment, he can choose between either €9.00 for himself and €1.00 for the recipient or 
€5.80 for both players.8 In case of the low endowment all amounts are exactly half. The 
recipient has no choice but to accept the dictator’s decision. All subjects made the dictator’s 
decision. The dictator and the recipient were always in the same treatment and subjects were 
aware of this fact. For example, if in the Effort rich treatment the dictator was to divide his 
earnings of €10.00 he knew that the recipient had also earned €10.00 but in the role of the 
recipient she had no chance to revert to the money. Since the subjects had only two 
alternatives to distribute the money, we can only determine whether the subjects’ aversion 
against advantageous inequality is above or below the critical value of βi = 0.4. 
Game B is a modified ultimatum game designed to analyse the subjects’ aversion against 
disadvantageous inequality. The game involves two players, a proposer and a responder. The 
proposer offers how to divide his endowment: In case of the high endowment, he can choose 
between either €8.30 for himself and €1.70 for his co-player or €5.00 for both players. In case 
of the low endowment all amounts are exactly half. In the second stage of the game the 
responder decides whether she would accept the unequal distribution. If she accepts the 
unequal distribution the money will be distributed as proposed. If she does not accept the 
proposal both players receive €1.00. If the proposer suggests the equal distribution this 
proposal will be realised presuming the responder’s acceptance. Game B was played with the 
strategy method, i.e. all subjects made both decisions in the role of the proposer and the 
responder. Thus, in game B we follow Fehr and Schmidt (2006) who recommend using 
“strategic games” in order to elicit preference parameters, capturing not only traits of 
inequality aversion, but also strategic considerations like intentions and reciprocity. Again, 
the proposer and the responder were in the same treatment. The responder’s decision is 
relevant for the individual aversion against disadvantageous inequality. Since the subjects’ 
                                                 
8 Payoffs in games A and B were determined in pretests to ensure that we obtained a sufficient number of 
observations for each decision. 
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decision was dichotomous, i.e. they could accept or reject one pre-defined proposal of an 
unequal distribution we can only determine whether the subjects’ aversion against 
disadvantageous inequality is above or below the critical value of αi = 0.1.  
Due to the four possible combinations of values of the parameters αi and βi we find four 
possible “types” of individuals. People with low αi and low βi are mainly concerned with their 
own absolute payoffs. This egocentric type of individuals is consequently called EGO. The 
opposite case are individuals who suffer from having a lower payoff than others (high αi) and 
a higher payoff than others (high βi). These individuals are called FAIR types. There are two 
mixed types. Individuals not significantly caring for having less payoff than others (low αi) 
but suffering from others having lower payoffs than they have themselves (high βi) are 
CARING. The reverse type is ENVIOUS, individuals who suffer from being worse off than 
others (high αi) but do not care too much for being ahead of others (low βi). 
The typification of subjects results in four different types which are presented in table 2.  
Table 2: Types 
Parameter  αi 
  αi > 0.1 αi < 0.1 
βi > 0.4 FAIR CARING βi βi < 0.4 ENVIOUS EGO 
Notes: In experimental pre-tests we tried different critical values by varying the payoffs in games 
A and B. The implemented critical values guarantee that each type has a sufficient number of 
observations. We assume that the individuals whose αi or βi equals the critical value, decided 
randomly and therefore did not bias the distribution of types. 
 
3.3 Prisoner’s dilemma games 
After subjects had completed the typification they played two PD games (C and D) in 
deliberately composed pairs. Each player was informed how his co-players in games C and D 
had behaved in games A and B. During the typification games, the subjects did not know that 
further games would follow and that their co-players in the following games would be 
informed about their decisions in these games. We believe that this is a sound way to avoid 
strategic behaviour on the one hand and deception of subjects on the other hand in order to 
test theories which make type-specific predictions.9 Both PD games contained a try-out round 
                                                 
9 Several authors, see e.g. Ockenfels and Weimann (2002), Ben-Ner et al. (2004), and Fischbacher and Gächter 
(2009), choose a similar way when they match subjects according to the behaviour in previous games without 
informing subjects in advance about this procedure. 
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that was not relevant for the payoff. Game C is a PD where the two players can decide 
whether or not they want to cooperate. The corresponding payoffs are presented in table 3. 
Table 3: Payoffs in the PD (game C) 
Payoffs in €  Player 2 
  Cooperation Defecti
Cooperation 8.40; 8.40 4.20; 11.20 
on 
Player 1 Defection 11.20; 4.20 7.00; 7.00 
Note: The instructions for the PD did not use the expression “to cooperate” and “to defect”, 
but “to contribute to a joint project” and “not to contribute to the project”. 
 
Game D consists of two stages. The first stage is equivalent to game C. After the players are 
informed about their co-player’s decision in the first stage, a second stage follows where 
subjects have the possibility to reduce the co-player’s payoff, i.e. a punishment mechanism is 
introduced (Fehr and Gächter 2000). If a player chooses the punishment possibility the own 
payoff is reduced by €0.40 and the co-player’s payoff is reduced by €4.00. 
Subjects were paid separately for games A and B, and games C and D. The payments from 
games A and B were computed as follows: Subjects in the same treatment were randomly 
matched into pairs. One of the two games was randomly chosen and the corresponding roles 
in that game were randomly allocated to each player in a pair. Payments were then determined 
by the players’ decisions. The payments from games C and D were determined in a similar 
way: Subjects in the same treatment were randomly matched into pairs. A random draw 
determined which game would be relevant and the payments were realised according to the 
players’ decisions in that game. The payoff rules were common knowledge to all participants. 
3.4 Hypotheses for the PD games 
The analysis of F&S in this paper is based upon the assumption that players know their 
opponents’ type. For this reason, in our experimental treatments, we informed the participants 
prior to the PD games (games C and D) on how their opponent had behaved in games A and B 
played before. Thus, these subjects were principally able to derive the corresponding type of 
their co-player.  
Based on the experimental design and the theoretical explanations in section 2, we are able to 
derive cooperation hypotheses for all pairs depending on their composition. Thereby we 
assume that, whenever F&S predict the existence of multiple equilibria, subjects will prefer 
the Pareto dominant equilibrium, i.e. the one with the higher monetary payoff. The 
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cooperation hypotheses for all possible combinations of types are presented in table 4. The 
hypotheses are independent of the treatment, i.e. the fact that someone has earned the 
endowment or that someone has a relatively low endowment does not affect the theoretical 
prognosis.  
Table 4: Cooperation hypotheses 
Type combination PD (game C) P-PD (game D) 
FAIR-FAIR, FAIR-CARING, CARING-CARING Cooperation Cooperation 
FAIR-ENVIOUS, FAIR-EGO, ENVIOUS-ENVIOUS Defection Cooperation 
CARING-ENVIOUS, CARING-EGO, ENVIOUS-EGO, EGO-EGO Defection Defection 
Notes: All equilibria are symmetric, i.e. either both players cooperate or both players defect.  
Abbreviations: PD = prisoner’s dilemma, P-PD = PD with punishment opportunity.  
The punishment hypothesis can be derived in a similar way. According to F&S the following 
conditions have to be fulfilled in order to rationalise punishment behaviour by a subject i at 
the second stage of game D: (i) for i’s aversion to disadvantageous inequality 1.0>iα  holds, 
(ii) subject i cooperates in game D, and (iii) the co-player j in game D defects. 
4. Results 
Six hundred students participated in the experiment which took place in April and October 
2008 at the experimental laboratory MaxLab of the University of Magdeburg, Germany. Our 
design was arranged a way that 150 subjects participated in each treatment. The subjects’ 
socio-economic characteristics are presented in table 11 in the appendix. 
The result section is divided into two parts. The first part is about the subjects’ behaviour in 
the modified dictator and ultimatum games, and individual inequality aversion. The second 
part is about the questions (i) whether there is a house money effect and (ii) whether the 
subjects’ inequality aversion can account for different individual behaviour in the PD games. 
4.1 Elicitation of inequality aversion 
Table 5 shows the subjects’ decisions in both games broken down by treatment. In game A 
overall 50 % of the subjects choose the equal distribution, i.e. for those subjects 4.0>iβ  
holds. Regarding the treatments, about 55 % choose the equal distribution in No effort rich 
while in all other treatments 47 % to 49 % do so. Using the binomial test there are no 
significant ceteris-paribus differences between treatments (see table 12 in the appendix). 
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Table 5: Subjects’ decision in game A and game B 
Subjects’ decisions Frequency in % 
Game A Dictator choosing equal split (βi > 0.4) 50.17 
(modified  Effort rich         48.67 
dictator game)  No effort rich         55.33 
  Effort poor         47.33 
 No effort poor         49.33 
Game B Proposer proposing unequal split 31.33 
(modified  Effort rich        26.00 
ultimatum game)  No effort rich        33.00 
  Effort poor        34.67 
 No effort poor        31.33 
 Responder rejecting unequal split (αi > 0.1) 34.17 
 Effort rich        37.33 
 No effort rich        28.67 
 Effort poor        34.00 
 No effort poor        36.67 
 
In game B overall 31 % propose the unequal distribution. In Effort rich, only 26 % decide this 
way while in all other treatments 31 % to 35 % do so. The differences (see table 12 in the 
appendix) are at least weakly significant between Effort rich and No effort rich (p = 0.056) as 
well as between Effort rich and Effort poor (p = 0.020). Considering the responder’s choice, 
which determines parameter iα , we observe that overall 34 % of the subjects reject the 
unequal distribution. For those subjects 1.0>iα  holds. In No effort rich we observe an 
exceptionally low rejection rate of about 29 % while the rejection rate is highest with over 
37 % in Effort rich. The differences are significant between No Effort rich and Effort rich 
(p = 0.028) as well as No effort rich and No effort poor (p = 0.037). Thus, we can state the 
following results: 
Result 1: Parameter βi is not affected by the treatment variables.  
Result 2: Proposers give more money in Effort rich than in the corresponding 
treatments. Parameter iα  is higher in Effort rich compared to No effort rich. Thus, with 
respect to iα  there is a house money effect for the high-endowment case. Since iα  is 
higher in No effort poor than in No effort rich, there is also a stake effect for the no-
effort case. 
The fact that dictator behaviour does not vary over treatments does not necessarily mean that 
the treatment variables do not affect the distribution of types according to the F&S model. If, 
for example, at the aggregate level, 50% of subjects choose the equal split, this can be caused 
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by different mixtures of FAIR and CARING types which both dispose of 4.0>iβ . The next 
step, therefore, is to analyse the distribution of types and how these distributions are affected 
by our treatment variables. Figure 1 shows the distribution of types in each treatment. While 
the distribution of types looks very similar across the treatments Effort rich, Effort poor, and 
No effort poor, the distribution in No effort rich clearly differs from all other treatments. A 
chi-square goodness-of-fit test confirms this impression. While the differences between No 
effort rich and each of the other treatments are significant (p < 0.01), there are no significant 
differences between the other three treatments.  
Figure 1: Relative frequencies of types [in %] 
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A closer look at the data reveals which types are responsible for this observation (see table 13 
in the appendix). On the one hand, in Effort rich the fraction of FAIR types is significantly 
higher than in No effort rich. On the other hand, in Effort rich the fraction of CARING types 
is significantly lower than in No Effort rich (chi-square test, p < 0.01). This effect is reversed 
when we compare No effort rich with No effort poor. The fraction of FAIR types is 
significantly lower in No effort rich compared to No effort poor (p < 0.05), but the fraction of 
CARING types is significantly higher in No effort rich than in No effort poor (p < 0.01). 
There are no other significant differences of types between treatments. To sum up, we can 
state the following results: 
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Result 3: There is a house money effect in the high-endowment case. In Effort rich, 
FAIR types are more frequent and CARING types less frequent than in No effort rich.  
Result 4: There is a stake effect in the no-effort case. In No effort rich, FAIR types are 
less frequent and CARING types are more frequent than in No effort poor. 
4.2 Prisoner’s dilemma games 
To analyse the subjects’ behaviour in the PD games we look at the mean per-pair cooperation 
rates. For each pair the mean cooperation rate can only amount to 0 (neither of the two players 
cooperates), 0.5 (one of the two players cooperates) or 1 (both players cooperate). Table 6 
shows the mean per-pair cooperation rates sorted by treatments. Moreover, it is distinguished 
between the subjects who are in a pair with the cooperation hypothesis and the subjects who 
are in a pair with the defection hypothesis (see table 4). 
Table 6: Mean per-pair cooperation rates in the PD games 
  Treatments 
Game Total Effort 
rich 
Effort 
poor 
No effort 
rich 
No effort 
poor 
Obs. 300 75 75 75 75 
Mean 0.125 0.127 0.093 0.153 0.127 
PD  
(game C) 
Standard error 0.014 0.027 0.025 0.029 0.029 
 Mutual cooperation 6 1 1 2 2 
Obs. 111 18 33 31 29 
Mean 0.176 0.167 0.136 0.161 0.241 
  Pairs with 
  cooperation 
  hypothesis Standard error 0.017 0.039 0.024 0.029 0.045 
 Mutual cooperation 4 1 1 1 1 
Obs. 189 57 42 44 46 
Mean 0.095 0.114 0.060 0.148 0.054 
Standard error 0.007 0.015 0.009 0.022 0.008 
  Pairs with 
  defection 
  hypothesis 
Mutual cooperation 2 0 0 1 1 
Obs. 300 75 75 75 75 
Mean 0.138 0.160 0.133 0.140 0.120 
PD with  
punishment  
(game D) Standard error 0.014 0.029 0.027 0.031 0.028 
 Mutual cooperation 7 1 1 3 2 
Obs. 130 33 29 30 38 
Mean 0.133 0.151 0.121 0.183 0.092 
  Pairs with 
  cooperation 
  hypothesis Standard error 0.012 0.026 0.022 0.033 0.015 
 Mutual cooperation 3 0 0 2 1 
Obs. 170 42 46 45 37 
Mean 0.143 0.200 0.141 0.111 0.149 
  Pairs with 
  defection 
  hypothesis Standard error 0.011 0.026 0.021 0.017 0.024 
 Mutual cooperation 4 1 1 1 1 
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Let us first consider the PD. The first column of the table shows that overall 12.5 % of the 
subjects cooperate. The mean cooperation rate of the subjects with cooperation hypothesis is 
17.6 % and with defection hypothesis 9.5 % only. This difference is highly significant (exact 
MW U test, p < 0.01). The finding that subjects with cooperation hypothesis cooperate more 
often applies to all treatments. The difference in cooperation rates, however, strongly differs 
between the treatments. While the difference is large in No effort poor and to lesser extend in 
Effort poor, it is rather small in Effort rich and No effort rich. The comparison of cooperation 
rates by means of the MW U test indicates that the differences in Effort rich, No effort rich, 
and Effort poor are insignificant (p > 0.10). In contrast, the difference is highly significant in 
No effort poor (p = 0.000). It seems that inequality aversion elicited via the distribution of a 
small amount of house money are able to explain individual behaviour in the PD better, than 
using a relatively large endowment of house money or any amount of earned money. 
We do not observe such an effect in the PD with punishment opportunity. Overall, 13.8 % of 
the subjects cooperate in this game. The mean per-pair cooperation rate of all subjects with 
cooperation hypothesis is in fact lower than the one of all subjects with defection hypothesis. 
The difference in the mean cooperation rate between subjects with and without cooperation 
hypothesis is not significant (exact MW U test, p > 0.10), neither for single treatments nor for 
all treatments taken together.  
Higher mean cooperation rates for pairs with cooperation hypothesis, however, do not mean 
that these pairs are able to successfully coordinate at the Pareto superior equilibrium more 
often, compared to pairs with defection hypothesis. As the numbers in table 6 show, there are 
only a few cases were subjects mutually cooperate – independently from the treatment. 
By means of a regression analysis of the whole sample we are able to analyse whether the 
subjects with the cooperation hypothesis, have a higher willingness to cooperate in the PD 
controlling for other factors which may influence the subjects’ behaviour. Since the decisions 
in the games C and D are dichotomous we use the logit regression model, one of the most 
frequently used models for binary outcomes. Table 7 shows the logit regression estimates for 
the PD. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the individual cooperation in the PD. 
The independent variables include dummy variables for the treatment variables (effort, rich), 
socio-economic variables (experience, economics), and a dummy variable for the respective 
cooperation hypothesis (C-hypothesis). The first column shows the regression results 
estimated on the whole sample. They indicate that the probability to cooperate is significantly 
higher for subjects being in a pair with the cooperation hypothesis. Furthermore, the 
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probability to cooperate is significantly lower for students with an economic subject. The 
treatment variables and other socio-economic variables do not have significant effects. The 
regression results estimated on treatment subsamples indicate that the impact of the 
theoretical hypothesis is mainly driven by the treatment No effort poor. In this treatment, a 
change from defection to cooperation hypothesis increases the probability to cooperate by 
about 17 percentage points. 
Table 7: Logit regression for cooperation in the PD 
  Subsamples 
Variable Total Effort rich Effort poor No effort rich No effort poor 
Effort -0.020 
(0.027)     
    
Rich 0.037 
(0.026)      
    
Experience -0.002    
(0.004)     
-0.011 
(0.008)     
0.010 
(0.006)     
0.003  
(0.009) 
-0.010 
(0.009) 
Economics -0.095*** 
(0.027)     
-0.110* 
(0.058)     
-0.109**   
(0.051) 
-0.075 
(0.059) 
-0.095* 
(0.051)   
C-hypothesis 0.067**  
(0.028)      
0.043 
0.063 
0.076  
(0.048) 
-0.004  
(0.061) 
0.166***   
(0.058) 
No. of obs. 
Wald chi2 
P > chi2 
Pseudo R2 
598 
23.40 
0.000 
0.053 
150 
9.16 
0.027 
0.067 
149 
5.89 
0.117 
0.085 
149 
1.66 
0.647 
0.013 
150 
13.28 
0.004 
0.142 
Notes: Numbers are average marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Asterisks (*, **, 
***) denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. A dummy (1 if cooperation, 0 if 
defection) is the dependent variable. Definition of independent variables: effort: 1 (0) if endowment was (not) 
earned, rich: 1 (0) if endowment was € 10.00 (€ 5.00), experience: number of participations in experiments, 
economics: 1 (0) if subject has (not) an economic major, C-hypothesis: 1 (0) if subject is (not) in a pair with the 
cooperation hypothesis. 
 
In the following we describe the results of similar regressions for the PD with punishment 
possibility (see table 8). The results indicate that the subjects behave consistently across the 
two PD games since subjects who cooperate in the PD are also more likely to cooperate in the 
punishment PD. The behaviour of the co-player j in the PD does not significantly change the 
probability to cooperate in the punishment PD, which makes sense because the co-players in 
the two games were different. The cooperation hypothesis does not have a significant effect 
which could be expected from the non-parametric tests. Thus, from the non-parametric tests 
and regression analysis we can state the following results: 
Result 5: With respect to the cooperation rates, the F&S model has predictive power in 
the PD only for No effort poor.  
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Result 6: For the cooperative behaviour in the PD with punishment possibility, F&S has 
no explanatory power at all. Subjects who cooperate in the PD show a higher 
probability to cooperate in the PD with punishment possibility. 
Table 8: Logit regression for cooperation in the punishment PD (game D) 
  Subsamples 
Variable Total Effort rich Effort poor No effort rich No effort poor 
Effort 0.026 
(0.027) 
    
Rich 0.013 
(0.027) 
    
Experience 0.009** 
(0.004) 
0.013*  
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
-0.000 
(0.008) 
0.011 
(0.006) 
Economics -0.003 
(0.028) 
-0.008 
(0.063) 
-0.005 
(0.059) 
0.011 
(0.058) 
0.014 
(0.052) 
C-hypothesis -0.005 
(0.027) 
0.013 
(0.063) 
-0.041 
(0.049) 
0.074 
(0.063) 
-0.085* 
(0.046) 
PD-C 0.340*** 
(0.061) 
0.275** 
(0.127) 
0.473*** 
(0.152) 
0.248** 
(0.106) 
0.489*** 
(0.110) 
PDother-C 0.037 
(0.043) 
0.074 
(0.105) 
0.091 
(0.090) 
0.035 
(0.081) 
-0.022 
(0.057) 
No. of obs. 
Wald chi2 
P > chi2 
Pseudo R2 
598 
53.64 
0.000 
0.108 
150 
10.35 
0.066 
0.069 
149 
18.02 
0.003 
0.174 
149 
10.54 
0.061 
0.080 
150 
26.1 
0.000 
0.223 
Notes: Numbers are average marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Asterisks (*, **, 
***) denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. A dummy (1 if cooperation, 0 if 
defection) is the dependent variable. Definition of independent variables: effort: 1 (0) if endowment was (not) 
earned, rich: 1 (0) if endowment was € 10.00 (€ 5.00), experience: number of participations in experiments, 
economics: 1 (0) if subject has (not) an economic major, C-hypothesis: 1 (0) if subject is (not) in a pair with the 
cooperation hypothesis, PD-C: 1 (0) if subject (did not cooperate) cooperated in the PD, PDother-C: 1 (0) if 
subject’s co-player (did not cooperate) cooperated in the PD.   
The observed punishment behaviour at the second stage of game D can be compared with the 
punishment hypothesis. Overall subjects punish in 116 of 600 cases (19 %). This is much 
more than one would have expected according to F&S – the model predicts punishment in 
only 19 cases (3 %). Furthermore, the percentage of cases correctly predicted by the 
punishment hypothesis is only about 13 %. The descriptive statistics are shown in table 9 
below. The differences between observed and expected punishment are highly significant 
(binomial test, p < 0.01). Table 14 in the appendix shows who punishes. Over all treatments 
EGO types have the highest probability to punish (41 of 116 cases are EGO types). 
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Table 9: Punishment behaviour in the punishment PD (game D) 
Treatment observed 
punishment 
expected punishment 
according to F&S 
punishment  
correctly predicted by F&S 
Effort rich 38 (25.33) 6 (4.00) 5 (13.16) 
Effort poor 24 (16.00) 6 (4.00) 4 (16.67) 
No effort rich 28 (18.67) 6 (4.00) 5 (17.86) 
No effort poor 26 (17.33) 1 (0.67) 1   (3.85) 
   total 116 (19.33) 19 (3.17) 15 (12.93) 
Notes: Numbers are the absolute frequency, relative frequency in % are in brackets. 
 
Analogously to the cooperation behaviour in game D, a logit regression is run for the 
subjects’ use of the punishment opportunity (table 10). The dependent variable is a dummy 
indicating whether or not the subject punishes his co-player. The results estimated on the total 
sample show that subjects who cooperate in the first stage of the punishment PD are 
significantly more likely to punish their co-players. Furthermore, the dummy variable for the 
respective punishment hypothesis (P-hypothesis) is weakly significant. The regression results, 
estimated on treatment subsamples, indicate that the impact of the punishment hypothesis is 
driven by the treatment No effort rich. In this treatment, a change from non-punishment to 
punishment hypothesis increases the probability to punish by about 53 %. Remarkably, in 
none of the effort treatments the punishment hypothesis has a significant effect.  
The following result, with respect to the punishment behaviour, can be stated: 
Result 7: Overall, subjects punish more often then one would have expected according 
to F&S. Subjects who cooperate in game D are significantly more likely to punish their 
co-players. The punishment hypothesis has predictive power in No effort rich only. 
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Table 10: Logit regression for punishment (game D) 
  Subsamples 
Variable Total Effort rich Effort poor No effort rich No effort poor 
Effort 0.017 
(0.030) 
    
Rich 0.043 
(0.030) 
    
Experience -0.001 
(0.004) 
0.011 
(0.008) 
-0.008 
(0.008) 
-0.016 
(0.009) 
-0.000 
(0.009) 
Economics -0.018 
(0.031) 
0.056 
(0.066) 
-0.005 
(0.057) 
-0.047 
(0.058) 
-0.081 
(0.063) 
P-hypothesis 0.240* 
(0.144) 
0.208 
(0.254) 
0.015 
(0.123) 
0.537** 
(0.258) 
―1 
P-PD-C 0.342*** 
(0.066) 
0.381*** 
(0.114) 
0.509*** 
(0.127) 
0.152 
(0.150) 
0.289** 
(0.136) 
P-PDother-C -0.048 
(0.045) 
-0.099 
(0.083) 
-0.094 
(0.084) 
0.074 
(0.103) 
-0.095 
(0.077) 
No. of obs. 
Wald chi2 
P > chi2 
Pseudo R2 
598 
63.44 
0.000 
0.121 
150 
21.41 
0.001 
0.141 
149 
23.76 
0.000 
0.211 
149 
18.92 
0.002 
0.140 
149 
10.49 
0.033 
0.072 
Notes: Numbers are average marginal effects. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. Asterisks (*, **, 
***) denote statistical significance at the 0.1, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. A dummy (1 if punishment, 0 if 
not) is the dependent variable. Definition of independent variables: effort: 1 (0) if endowment was (not) earned, 
rich: 1 (0) if endowment was € 10.00 (€ 5.00), experience: number of participations in experiments, economics: 1 
(0) if subject has (not) an economic major, P-hypothesis: if subject should punish according to the punishment 
hypothesis, P-PD-C: 1 (0) if subject cooperated (did not cooperate) in the first stage of the punishment PD, 
PDother-C: 1 if subject’s co-player cooperated (did not cooperate) in the first stage of the punishment PD. 
1 Observation dropped since there is only one case with P-hypotheses = 1. 
 
5 Discussion and conclusion 
The first objective of our study was to run a “robustness check” for inequality aversion with 
respect to the house money effect. In this regard the robustness of the dictator’s generosity 
across treatments is a remarkable result of our study. Particularly, their willingness to choose 
the equal split is not affected by the way how the subjects obtained their money. At first sight, 
this seems surprising since it contrasts the results in Cherry (2001) who observes a sharp 
decline in positive offers as soon as dictators had to earn their endowment by employing some 
effort. A closer inspection, however, may quickly solve this puzzle. Contrary to the design 
chosen by Cherry, in our experiment both parties – dictators and recipients – had to work. 
Previous work has shown that the “deservingness” has a measurable impact on dictators’ 
givings. Ruffle (1998), for example, observes an increase in dictators’ offers after he 
increased the deservingness of the recipients. This effect has also been observed by Eckel and 
Grossman (1996) in a different context: When an anonymous subject in the role of the 
recipient is replaced by an established charity, in this case the American Red Cross, donations 
will triple. However, not only the deservingness of the recipient, but also the dictator’s 
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deservingness may influence offers: If dictators think that they deserve a higher share than the 
equal, as they have spent some effort to receive their money, their giving surely will decline. 
This is the observation in Cherry (2001). Hence, increasing only the deservingness of 
recipients will only get the dictators to choose positive offers more often, but increasing only 
the deservingness of the dictator will make donations decrease. However, in our setting there 
is no asymmetry between the players, i.e. the relative deservingness is constant across all 
treatments. This helps to explain why the dictator’s behaviour is so stable across treatments. 
Interestingly, a different effect seems to be the case for iα , the weight of disadvantageous 
inequality. With respect to iα  we observe a house money effect, i.e. responders more often 
reject unequal proposals when they had successfully worked for their endowment. Thus, 
despite the fact that relative deservingness has not changed in this situation, responders have a 
different view on what is the “fair share”. As the perception of this acceptable share is moving 
towards their own favour, subjects reject low offers with higher frequency – their iα  
increases. In other words, we observe a self-serving change in the judgment on what displays 
an acceptable offer. Babcock and Loewenstein (1997) summarise an impressive body of 
empirical evidence indicating that under circumstances of “morally ambiguous settings in 
which there are competing ‘focal points’” people tend to rely on the fairness notion which 
favours what is in their self-interest. Already in the standard ultimatum game with house 
money, the rejection of “unfair” offers can be explained by this behavioural pattern. 
Obviously, in the effort case, the self-serving change in the judgment on an acceptable offer is 
strengthened and can therefore explain the change of the responders’ behaviour. 
Regarding the proposers’ behaviour in the ultimatum game we find that proposers are more 
generous in the Effort rich treatment. This is much in line with a rational expectations 
approach: In the high-endowment case, proposers correctly anticipate that responders will 
reject unequal offers more often when they have successfully worked for their endowment. 
Thus, subjects are quite rational in the way they incorporate equity into their decisions. Again, 
the results of our design, where both subjects have to show effort in order to get the high 
endowment, fit well to the ultimatum game results in section 1. Hoffman et al. (1994) observe 
no differences in the rejection rates of inactive responders between the effort and no-effort 
case, but a (again quite rational) decrease in offers by the proposers after they have 
successfully shown effort. If the deservingness of the responders is higher (Ruffle 1998) they 
are rewarded with higher offers by the proposers. Thus, similar to the dictator game above not 
only the proposer’s legitimation, but also the perceived legitimation of the other side (the 
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responder) matters.10 Another major goal of this study was to examine the predictive power of 
the theory of inequality aversion proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999). F&S propose 
inequality aversion as a unifying principle for major classes of decision tasks. However, while 
inequality aversion works excellent in theory by providing a “grand unified approach” for 
human behaviour in bargaining and cooperation games, experimental evidence for the power 
of this principle is weak. 
We used within-subject tests in order to check whether the measured degree of inequality 
aversion is responsible for cooperation or non-cooperation in a prisoner’s dilemma game. 
Although the decision tasks were highly simplified, it turns out that the F&S theory has only 
very limited explanatory power. This is not to say that inequality aversion is of no importance 
at all, but it seems that inequality aversion is not the main driving force behind observed 
behaviour in dilemma situations. This paper has shown, that F&S predict individual behaviour 
only correctly in the context of low stakes in combination with house money. Taking on the 
suggestion of Teyssier (2009), that the implications of inequality aversion may be overruled 
by other forces such as risk aversion, the low predictive power of F&S in our experiment may 
be due to strategic uncertainty about others’ behaviour. Even though the subjects were 
informed about their co-player’s type, there possibly remained some uncertainty about the co-
player’s behaviour in the prisoner’s dilemma, which might have reduced the influence of 
inequality aversion. Seeing the uncertainties in real world social dilemmas, the applicability 
of the F&S model beyond the laboratory is at least questionable. 
When thinking about the applicability of inequality aversion to real world problems, another 
aspect has to be taken into account. In our experiment, consistency of preferences is only 
needed for a very short time period, namely the duration of the experiment. In other words, 
even under “best case” conditions, the explanatory power of inequality aversion is very 
limited. Brosig et al. (2007) analyse the consistency of individual behaviour within and across 
different classes of games and the stability of individual behaviour over time by running the 
same experiments on the same subjects at several points in time. Their results demonstrate 
that other-regarding preferences seem to wash out over time. In the final wave of experiments, 
it is the classical theory of selfish behaviour that delivers the best explanation of the observed 
                                                 
10 It remains puzzling, that in the No-effort case subjects with a high endowment reject unequal offers with 
higher probability than subjects with low endowment. It seems that with a “disappointingly low” endowment 
subjects simply have a different notion of what is “fair”. 
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behaviour. Stable behaviour over time is observed only for subjects who behave strictly 
selfish. These results strengthen our doubts about the explanatory power of the F&S model. 
Concluding, we think that more research is needed in order to refine the concept of inequality 
aversion and related concepts of other-regarding preferences. A remaining question is, 
whether the house money effect observed in this paper can be reproduced for a more 
differentiated structure of behavioural types and for higher stakes. As our results indicate, it 
may well be possible that there is an interaction between the house money and the stake 
effect. Furthermore, a more general remaining question is which kind of preferences drives 
individual behaviour in social dilemma situations. These issues remain to be answered by 
future research. 
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Appendix 
Table 11: Socio-economic characteristics 
Socio-economic characteristics Frequency Frequency in % 
Total  600      100.00 
Field of study   
Economic major  318       53.00 
Non-economic major  282       47.00 
Sex  
Male  315       52.50 
Female  285       47.50 
Experience in experiments   
First experiment  136       22.74 
Second experiment  104       17.39 
Two or more experiments before  358       59.87 
 
 
Table 12: Fraction of decisions in game A and B 
House money effect 
Decision 
Effort 
rich 
No effort 
rich 
p- 
value 
 Effort 
poor 
No effort 
poor 
p- 
value 
Game A: choosing equal split  
   (βi > 0.4) 
48.67 55.33 0.101  47.33 49.33 0.683 
Game B: Proposer choosing  
   unequal split 26.00 33.33 0.056  34.67 31.33 0.380 
Game B: Responder rejecting  
   unequal split (αi > 0.1) 
37.33 28.67 0.024  34.00 36.67 0.553 
Stake effect 
Decision 
Effort 
rich 
Effort 
poor 
p- 
value 
 No effort 
rich 
No effort 
poor 
p- 
value 
Game A: choosing equal split  
   (βi > 0.4) 
48.67 47.33 0.745  55.33 49.33 0.143 
Game B: Proposer choosing  
   unequal split 26.00 34.67 0.026  33.33 31.33 0.598 
Game B: Responder rejecting  
   unequal split (αi > 0.1) 
37.33 34.00 0.390  28.67 36.67 0.042 
 Exact binomial test. N = 150 for each treatment.  
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Table 13: Fraction of types 
House money effect 
Type 
Effort 
rich 
No effort 
rich 
p- 
value 
 Effort 
poor 
No effort 
poor 
p- 
value 
   FAIR 20.67 13.33 0.011  18.67 20.00 0.760 
   CARING 28.00 42.00 0.000  28.67 29.33 0.929 
   ENVIOUS 16.67 15.33 0.650  15.33 16.67 0.743 
   EGO 34.67 29.33 0.152  37.33 34.00 0.340 
Stake effect 
Type 
Effort 
rich 
Effort 
poor 
p- 
value 
 No effort 
rich 
No effort 
poor 
p- 
value 
   FAIR 20.67 18.67 0.530  13.33 20.00 0.041 
   CARING 28.00 28.67 0.928  42.00 29.33 0.001 
   ENVIOUS 16.67 15.33 0.650  15.33 16.67 0.743 
   EGO 34.67 37.33 0.555  29.33 34.00 0.262 
Exact binomial test. N = 150 observations for each treatment.  
Table 14: Punishment behaviour 
        Type 
 Pair   % EGO CARING ENVIOUS FAIR 
Effort rich cd 14 36.8 6 3 3 2 
 cc 1 2.6 0 0 0 1 
 dd 20 52.6 8 3 7 2 
 dc 3 7.9 1 1 0 1 
  38 100.0 15 7 10 6 
Effort poor cd 12 50.0 7 1 3 1 
 cc 0 0.0 0 0 0 0 
 dd 11 45.8 3 1 3 4 
 dc 1 4.2 0 0 0 1 
  24 100.0 10 2 6 6 
No effort rich cd 9 32.1 2 2 2 3 
 cc 0 0.0 0 0 0 0 
 dd 12 42.9 2 4 3 3 
 dc 7 25.0 2 2 0 3 
  28 100.0 6 8 5 9 
No effort poor cd 8 30.8 4 3 1 0 
 cc 0 0.0 0 0 0 
 dd 16 61.5 5 3 4 
 dc 2 7.7 1 0 1 
  26 100.0 10 6 6 
0 
4 
0 
4 
total cd 43 37.1 19 9 9 6 
 cc 1 0.9 0 0 0 
 dd 59 50.9 18 11 17 
 dc 13 11.2 4 3 1 
    116 100.0 41 23 27 25 
1 
13 
5 
Pair = cd (cc; dd; dc) indicates that subject i cooperates and subject j defects (both subjects 
cooperate; both defect; subject i defects and subject j cooperates). Type indicates the 
punisher’s type.  
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Experimental instructions (“Effort rich” treatment) 
Welcome to the laboratory MaXLaB! 
Please read these instructions carefully and should you have any questions please give us a 
show of hands or open the door. In the laboratory experiment you are taking part in, you can 
win cash in € depending on your decisions and the decisions of your fellow players. All your 
decisions within the experiment will be anonymous. Only the experimenter will know your 
identity, but your data will be treated confidentially. Within the experiment you will be asked 
to make decisions in several games. You will receive detailed instructions during the 
experiment. Please do not communicate with one another during the experiment, and please 
touch the equipment in the booth only when you are asked to. Good luck for the experiment! 
Best regards, the MaXLaB-Team 
 
1) Entry of literature 
We first would like to ask you to earn money for the games in the experiment. To do so, you 
will have to enter details of a few literature sources (provided to you in your booth) into the 
computer. The more correct entries you achieve in the given 10 minutes, the more starting 
money will be granted to you for the following games. You can start entering the data only if 
you receive an according message on your screen. You will find an Excel file named 
“LITERATURE” on your screen in which the necessary details (Authors’ names, Title, 
Journal, Page Reference, Year) have to be entered (please do not open the file yet!). The 
screenshot below shows a sample entry form. 
Please enter the names of the authors into column “Name(s)” (see screenshot). Abbreviate the 
first name of the author(s) by entering the initial only. Please separate the names of several 
authors with a forward slash “/”. Please enter the title into column “Title” and the name of the 
magazine in column “Magazine”. When providing the page(s) in column “Page Reference” 
please do not use a minus “-”, but please write out “to”. Please enter the year of publication in 
column “Year” as a number. 
Only the data “Name(s)”, “Title”, “Magazine”, “Page Reference”, and “Year” need to be 
entered. Please provide the literature in the order at hand. We will check your data for 
completeness and correctness. Important: Please save the document “LITERATURE” after 
every complete entry, i.e. after each completed row (you can either press [Ctrl] + [S] or you 
can use the menu bar “File” – “Save”). The amount of valid entries will be displayed in the 
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upper right corner. We will inform you when you can start with your entries and about the 
remaining time. Please do not continue entering after the time has elapsed.  
 
2) Introduction Games A and B 
Please read the following instructions carefully. In the following you will participate in two 
games (game A and B). The rules of both games will be given to you on your screen in the 
next steps. After the experiment we will determine randomly which game (game A or B) will 
be paid out. Please note: You should play every game as if it were the one relevant for payout. 
In both games, you will encounter a fellow player who has been randomly determined out of 
other participants in the experiment. All decisions in the experiment will be made 
anonymously. Your fellow player will not know about your identity and neither will you 
about your fellow player’s. Should you have any questions please raise your hand or open the 
door and we will come to you.  
You have just earned your starting money for the following games A and B. You have entered 
relatively much literature, i.e. at least 50 % of the participants in this experiment have entered 
less literature than you. Therefore, you receive a relatively high amount of starting money of € 
10 for games A and B. 
 
3) Game A 
In game A there are two players: the “Distributor” and the “Receiver”. The distributor has to 
select a division of his gained starting money of €10.  He can choose from two possible pairs 
of divisions (LEFT and RIGHT) for himself and the receiver. When selecting LEFT the 
distributor gets € 9.00 and the receiver € 1.00. When selecting RIGHT the total amount of 
money increases and each player receives € 5.80. The division pair chosen by the distributor 
will be paid out. Payout: We will determine randomly which player will be distributor and 
which will be receiver in game A. Please note: Due to the application of this method, the 
distributor should behave as if the chosen amount of money will be paid out. Note: Your 
fellow player has also gained € 10. 
Decision as distributor 
Please choose from the following pairs of the division of your starting money by ticking the 
according box. 
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LEFT: 
For me (distributor): € 9.00 
For the other player (receiver): € 1.00 
My Choice [box] 
RIGHT:  
For me (distributor): € 5.80 
For the other player (receiver): € 5.80 
My Choice [box] 
 
4) Game B 
In game B there are two players: the “First-Drawer” and the “Second-Drawer”. The first-
drawer proposes a possible division of his starting money of € 10 by selecting either LEFT or 
RIGHT (see below for the amounts). The second-drawer can agree to the choice of LEFT or 
neglect it. If he neglects LEFT, both players receive € 1.00. If the second-drawer agrees to 
LEFT, then it will be divided according to the LEFT detail. If the first-drawer selects RIGHT, 
this choice will always be applied. We ask you to play this game both as first-drawer on this 
page, and as second-drawer on the following page. Payout: We will determine randomly who 
your fellow player will be. Then it will be determined randomly if your decision as first-
drawer or as second-drawer will be relevant for the payout. Please note: Due to the 
application of this method the first-drawer should behave as if the chosen amount of money 
will be paid out. Note: Your fellow player has also gained € 10.  
Decision as first-drawer 
Please choose from the following pairs about the division of your starting money by ticking 
the according box. 
LEFT 
For me (first-drawer): € 8.30 
For the other player (second-drawer): € 1.70 
My Choice [box] 
Information: If neglected by second-drawer both players receive € 1.00 
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RIGHT 
For me (first-drawer): € 5.00 
For the other player (second-drawer): € 5.00 
My Choice [box] 
Information: This choice cannot be neglected. 
Please note: your fellow player has the opportunity to neglect your proposal if you select 
LEFT. In this case you and your fellow player will receive € 1.00. If your fellow player 
accepts your proposal of LEFT, the choice will be paid out. The proposal RIGHT cannot be 
neglected. 
Decision as Second-drawer 
Please decide as the second-drawer if you want to accept the proposal of LEFT by the first-
drawer. Payout: We determine randomly if you are first-drawer or second-drawer in game B. 
Please note: Due to the application of this method, as a second-drawer you should behave as if 
your fellow player actually had proposed LEFT and you accepted or neglected the proposal. 
Note: Your fellow player has also gained € 10.  
If my fellow player has chosen LEFT as a division of his money and I accept this proposal, 
then: 
My payout is: € 1.70 
My fellow player’s payout is: € 8.30 
I accept the proposal of “€ 1.70 for me and € 8.30 for my fellow player” instead of choosing 
€ 1.00 for both of us. [box] 
If my fellow player has chosen LEFT as a division of his money and I neglect it, then:  
My payout is: € 1.00 
My fellow player’s payout is: € 1.00 
I neglect the proposal of “€ 1.70 for me and € 8.30 for my fellow player” and choose € 1.00 
for both of us. [box] 
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5) Game C 
In this game you will be put into the following decision making situation. There is a project to 
which you can “contribute” together with another player. If one player contributes both 
players profit from it, and so the following amounts can be gained: 
• If both players “contribute” to the project, each player receives € 8.40 
• If no player “contributes”, each player receives € 7.00 
• If one of the players “contributes” and the other does not, the “contributing” player 
receives € 4.20 and the player who does not “contribute” receives € 11.20 
We ask you to indicate on the screen whether you want to “contribute” in this situation or if 
you do not want to “contribute”. Further below on your screen, you will be given information 
about how your current fellow player has behaved in game A and game B. Your current 
fellow player is in the same decision making situation as you and is given the according 
information about your behaviour in game A and B on his screen. 
After game C you will be playing another game – game D, in which you will encounter a 
fellow player with whom you have not yet interacted. We will determine randomly which of 
both games, game C or D, will be paid out. Therefore, in game C you should behave as if 
exactly this game will be paid out. 
Please note: Before game C starts, you will be taking a trial round which is not relevant for 
the payout. Your fellow player in the trial round will be the computer. The computer’s 
decisions will be determined randomly. After the trial round, you will be playing the actual 
game C, which is relevant for the payout. There you will encounter your fellow player. You 
will be making only one decision in game C. 
 
6) Game D 
In this game you will be put into the following decision making situation with the stages I and 
II. Stage I is the same decision making situation as in game C. Again, there is a project to 
which you can “contribute” together with another player. If one player contributes both 
players profit from it, and so the following amounts can be gained: 
• If both players “contribute” to the project, each player receives € 8.40 
• If no player “contributes”, each player receives € 7.00 
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• If one of the players “contributes” and the other does not, the “contributing” player 
receives € 4.20 and the player who does not “contribute” receives € 11.20 
We ask you to indicate on the screen whether you want to “contribute” in this situation or if 
you do not want to “contribute”. Further below on your screen, you will be given information 
about how your current fellow player has behaved in game A and B. Please note that your 
current fellow player is not the same player as in game C. Your current fellow player is in the 
same decision making situation as you and is given the according information about your 
behaviour in game A and B on his screen. 
Stage I of game D is followed by stage II. On the screen you will be shown your decisions of 
stage I, the decisions of your fellow player of stage I, and the resulting incomes. Additionally 
you will again be informed about the behaviour of your fellow player of game A and B. In 
stage II you will now have the opportunity to reduce your fellow player’s income. If you 
select “Reduce fellow player’s income”, the income of your fellow player of stage I will be 
reduced by € 4.00. However, reducing your fellow player’s income is not free of charge for 
you. You have to pay € 0.40 for that, i.e. your own income will decrease by € 0.40 if you 
choose to reduce your fellow player’s income. Please indicate on the screen if you want to 
reduce your fellow player’s income (“Yes, I want to reduce my fellow player’s income by € 
4.00…”) or if you do not want to proceed like that (“No, I do not want to reduce my fellow 
player’s income.”). Again your fellow player is in the same situation as you and is given the 
according information on your behaviour.  
Please note: Prior to game D you will be taking a trial round, which is not relevant for the 
payout. Your “fellow player” in this trial round will be the computer. The computer’s 
decisions will be determined randomly. After the trial round, you will be playing the actual 
game D, which is relevant for the payout. There you will encounter your fellow player. You 
will be making only one decision in every stage of game D. 
 
